World Energy Outlook 2024

Executive Summary
Geopolitical tensions and fragmentation are major risks for energy security
and for coordinated action on reducing emissions
Escalating conflict in the Middle East and Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine underscore the
continued energy security risks that the world faces. Some of the immediate effects of the
global energy crisis had started to recede in 2023, but the risk of further disruptions is now
very high. The experience of the last few years shows how quickly dependencies can turn
into vulnerabilities; a lesson that applies also to clean energy supply chains that have high
levels of market concentration. Markets for traditional fuels and for clean technologies are
becoming more fragmented: since 2020, almost 200 trade measures affecting clean energy
technologies – most of them restrictive – have been introduced around the world, compared
with 40 in the preceding five-year period.
Fragility in today’s energy markets is a reminder of the abiding importance of energy
security – the foundational and central mission of the International Energy Agency (IEA) –
and the ways that more efficient, cleaner energy systems can reduce energy security risks.
The increasingly visible impacts of climate change, the momentum behind clean energy
transitions, and the characteristics of clean energy technologies are all changing what it
means to have secure energy systems. A comprehensive approach to energy security
therefore needs to extend beyond traditional fuels to cover the secure transformation of the
electricity sector and the resilience of clean energy supply chains. Energy security and climate
action are inextricably linked: extreme weather events, intensified by decades of high
emissions, are already posing profound energy security risks.

Modern bioenergy is versatile, but its sustainability credentials have come under scrutiny.
Currently, around 20% of its supply comes from cropland dedicated to conventional biofuel
production, and therefore is potentially competing with food production. The remaining 80%
of supply is from organic waste streams, and forest and wood residues. Questions have been
raised about this type of feedstock development on the grounds that it can have negative
effects on biodiversity and greenhouse gas emissions. Clear sustainability criteria and tools
such as life cycle greenhouse gas performance standards are essential to ensure that the
future development of bioenergy resources commands widespread public acceptance.
Modern bioenergy demand worldwide increases from 42 EJ today to 56 EJ by 2035 and to
more than 70 EJ by 2050 in the STEPS (Figure 3.41). In the APS and NZE Scenario, production
rises to almost 100 EJ by 2050, with the majority of feedstocks derived from sustainable
sources such as forestry and agricultural residues, recycled organic material and other
organic waste streams. The shift to these feedstocks is driven by regulations that
differentiate feedstocks based on their life cycle emissions and provide enhanced financial
support to projects with relatively low-emissions intensities.

Modern bioenergy demand by type and scenario, 2023-2050

Behavioural change
Behavioural changes by consumers to reduce energy use are an under-employed lever for
reaching energy security and climate goals. Behavioural change can help limit growth in
energy demand and thus curb emissions, especially in sectors where technical alternatives
are scarce or costly. Around 25 countries include behavioural measures in their Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) or long-term strategies. Most behavioural measures relate
to transport. For example, many European countries aim to reduce the use of private cars
through measures such as road space allocation schemes, low-emissions zones and
investment in public transport infrastructure and cycle lanes. Bangladesh and Türkiye include
targets for modal shifts from road transport to rail, while Colombia and Austria have set
targets for bicycle use.
Measures in NDCs and other climate strategies are incorporated into the APS, and they
account for less than 1% of the difference in emissions between the APS and the STEPS in 2035 This relatively small share reflects a perception by policy makers that measures to encourage behavioural change are unpopular. However, there is mounting evidence that it is possible to win public support for effective policies. For example, support for congestion charging in Stockholm, London and elsewhere increased significantly in the years following its introduction as parallel improvements were made in public transport and as citizens increasingly realised the benefits of reduced congestion and air pollution. Discretionary changes, such as reducing thermostat settings, were made by many people during the global energy crisis in 2022, in part in response to public awareness campaigns. In addition, many people that worked from home during the Covid-19 pandemic continue to do so, thereby
reducing commutes.

    Introduction
    The Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) is based on analysis of current policy settings and
    regulations. It aims to provide an understanding of where prevailing regional and global
    energy trends are leading us. However, the energy sector is influenced by a wide range of
    factors that make for uncertainty, as discussed in Chapter 2. These factors range from
    shifting geopolitics to changing policies and customer behaviour, and from fast-evolving
    climate impacts to changing markets and new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI).
    In this chapter we explore several key uncertainties, using a set of sensitivity cases to
    investigate how outputs could diverge from the STEPS trajectory. We focus our analysis of
    uncertainties on the STEPS because it is the scenario which provides a sense of the prevailing
    direction of travel for the energy sector. The sensitivity cases do not change the broad policy
    backdrop that underpins and drives the STEPS, or the economic and demographic
    assumptions that are reflected in the STEPS. Rather, they assess how varying some of the
    assumptions about deployment rates in the STEPS might affect the energy demand outlook
    by fuel, sector and region, focusing in particular on electric vehicles (EVs), renewables
    deployment, the liquefied natural gas (LNG) surplus and electricity demand.
    Each uncertainty is explored through the framework of the Global Energy and Climate (GEC)
    Model, which allows us to quantify impacts, and to combine different impacts to provide a
    better understanding of a plausible range of outcomes for demand by energy source, type
    and associated carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. When carrying this out, we consider the
    implications of each uncertainty for all fuels, including coal and renewables, as well as for
    CO2 emissions. We focus on their direct impacts and avoid making assumptions about
    consequential synergistic or counterbalancing effects in other areas of services demand. To
    isolate the impact of the factors analysed, we have assumed for our sensitivity cases that the
    price environment is consistent with the trajectories in the STEPS.

    Source:https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2024

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