India’s new climate targets must navigate geopolitical uncertainty [Commentary] – Mongabay India

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Well past the summer peak, India’s power system remains under strain. The country met daytime demand of over 267 GW even in September, yet fell short by more than 7.7 GW after sunset, when solar generation tapers off. India may have withdrawn its bid to host COP33 in 2028, but COP31, which opens in Antalya on November 9, will be the first UN climate summit since India submitted its 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). It raises the bar for climate ambition, targeting 60% non-fossil installed capacity by 2035 and relying heavily on the power sector to drive the transition over the next decade.
Climate impacts are rising in India and worldwide. The world will likely cross the 1.5°C threshold in the next few years, as per a recent UN Environment Programme (UNEP) report. The margin by which this threshold is breached before accelerated mitigation efforts bend the temperature curve again will determine how catastrophic climate impacts become.
All countries must double down on mitigation now. Yet India’s 2035 NDC targets are being tested in real time, as rising demand, especially in non-solar hours, pushes for all available options, including fossil energy. At the same time, annual power demand could still be hit if India’s economic growth slows because of global conflict, trade disputes, supply chain concentrations, energy inflation, and the impact of artificial intelligence. The clean energy transition risks losing momentum just as it needs to accelerate.
India’s current position reflects both progress and credibility. The country has already achieved its 2030 target of 50% non-fossil capacity, five years ahead of schedule, currently standing at 54%. It is making rapid strides in solving on-the-ground challenges to push a higher share of green electricity. The 60% target for 2035, therefore, is less about ambition alone and more about navigating uncertainty.
Analysis by the Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW) projects that India’s non-fossil capacity share could range between 60% and 68% in 2035. This eight-percentage-point spread captures how structural factors can alter the transition’s trajectory. Three key drivers negatively impact the share of non-fossil sources: two on the demand side and one on the supply side.
First, a low GDP growth trajectory could significantly suppress annual power demand. In a high-growth scenario, with average annual GDP growth of 7.6% and a rising manufacturing share between 2025 and 2035, India’s power demand could reach 3025 billion units in 2035. A lower growth trajectory of 5.90% reduced projected power demand to 2567 billion units. This difference implies that India would not need 458 billion units on the generation side if GDP growth slumps, significantly limiting the potential for new investments in non-fossil capacity.
Second, demand-side interventions could further moderate electricity consumption. India’s flagship Lifestyle of the Environment (LiFE) initiative promotes behavioural changes, such as running air conditioners at slightly higher temperatures. Adopting such behavioural practices can lower electricity consumption without compromising thermal comfort. If AC users adopt these measures widely, they would reduce electricity demand. While desirable from an efficiency standpoint, they also slow capacity expansion. This creates a policy tension: managing demand responsibly while ensuring that the energy system continues to scale in line with long-term climate goals.
Third, supply-side constraints remain significant. If duties on imported solar panels and domestic manufacturers’ inability to supply panels at lower price points continue to shape renewable energy costs, grid additions could slow significantly. This would directly affect the pace at which the non-fossil share rises, regardless of demand conditions. For example, if the price of solar electricity rises from ₹2.5/kWh to ₹3/kWh due to higher import duties on solar panels, this reduces the technology’s attractiveness to investors and slows investment.
Taken together, these factors point to a clear conclusion: India’s climate trajectory is highly sensitive to both economic and policy variables. If a combination of these scenarios pans out, even achieving the 60% target could be challenging.
More optimistic outcomes are also possible. Rapid technological progress and cost reductions across low-carbon technologies — such as nuclear, carbon capture and storage, bioenergy, and rooftop solar — could accelerate deployment beyond a 62% share of non-fossil sources. In fact, with higher GDP growth, simultaneous rapid reduction in the cost of multiple low carbon technologies, and decline in power costs for commercial and industrial sectors, India could even achieve a 68% share by 2035.
In this context, the 60% target reflects calibrated ambition rather than conservatism. It acknowledges uncertainties from both domestic dynamics and global disruptions that may affect growth, particularly the ongoing conflict in West Asia. Goldman Sachs has already revised India’s growth forecast for FY 2026-27 downward to 5.9%, from its earlier projection of 7%. As geopolitical shocks become more frequent, planning for uncertainty is no longer optional.
At the same time, rising oil and gas prices present a strategic opportunity. Higher fossil fuel prices can accelerate electrification across transport, cooking, and industry. Expanding electricity use in these sectors would increase power demand while reducing reliance on imported fuels. This, in turn, could spur more investment in non-fossil capacity and better align energy security with climate goals.
India’s updated NDC sets a clear direction, but its achievement will depend on how effectively the country manages this interplay between growth, demand, and technology. The power sector is critical to this strategy, as rising demand, capacity additions, and the integration of renewables must co-evolve. Beyond targets, India’s climate ambitions will depend on how effectively it navigates the uncertain implications of evolving geopolitics.
One key target pushed by the COP31 Presidency relates to the share of electricity in final energy use worldwide. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s sixth assessment report highlights the importance of electrifying the economy to achieve deep decarbonisation. This sector is therefore critical for the upcoming COP. However, higher electrification of final energy use will matter only if power supply is decarbonised. As we argue, current and emerging geopolitical uncertainties would critically affect India’s grid decarbonisation plans. India needs to foresee these to position itself better during turbulent times.
 
Banner image: Workers install solar panels on the rooftop of a home in Uttar Pradesh. (AP Photo/Rajesh Kumar Singh, File)
Vaibhav Chaturvedi is a Senior Fellow and Pallavi Das is Programme Lead at the Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW).
 
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